Regulatory Impact Statement: *Safer Journeys – New Zealand's Road Safety Strategy 2010 to 2020*

Agency disclosure statement

1. This Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) has been prepared by the Ministry of Transport (the Ministry).

2. It provides analysis to support the decision to use a new strategic framework for road safety, including a vision, Safe System approach, and 13 priority areas (split into high concern, medium concern and continuing focus) for where performance needs to be improved, as part of *Safer Journeys – New Zealand's Road Safety Strategy 2010 to 2020* (*Safer Journeys*).

3. The package of possible actions (both regulatory and non-regulatory) in *Safer Journeys* takes into account public feedback, research and evidence. A number of these measures have been shown to be effective in overseas jurisdictions and they are considered to be the initiatives most likely to make the greatest impact in addressing the road crash problem at this time.

4. As well as providing analysis to support the decision to use a new strategic framework, this RIS also includes an initial impact analysis of the first regulatory actions for formal Cabinet consideration to support the 'in principle' decision to include these in the road safety programme. This analysis includes a description of the problem, alternative options, potential risks and some preliminary high-level cost estimates and potential benefits.

5. Those initiatives requiring regulatory change that are progressed further will have a full regulatory impact analysis (including cost benefit analyses) completed as each package of initiatives is provided to Cabinet for consideration. Non-regulatory initiatives will also be subject to further analysis to ensure that they can be effectively implemented, with those actions that require funding changes (eg roading improvements) needing to satisfy the funding requirements of the National Land Transport Programme.

6. This RIS supports the decisions required at this stage. However, when some of the potential regulatory options within the strategy are progressed they may have large effects (eg on business) that will trigger the governments requirements for a strong case for change. This case will be provided as part of any further regulatory impact analysis.

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4 February 2010

Status quo and problem definition

7. Road crashes place a substantial but preventable burden on the economy and the health sector, and lower the quality of life of many New Zealanders. The social cost[1] of road crashes in New Zealand is approximately $3.8 billion dollars per annum. Social cost is an internationally accepted measure for estimating the cost of road crashes to society. It is made up of a number of elements including loss of life and life quality, loss of output due to temporary incapacitation, medical costs, legal costs and property damage costs.

8. In 2008/09 ACC motor vehicle-related claims accounted for 15 percent of all ACC costs, or $452 million, with the average cost per each road injury over $75,000. Further to this, injuries sustained on public roads account for $6.8 billion (29 percent) of the $23.8 billion in outstanding ACC claim liability as of 30 June 2009. Road crashes also have a detrimental effect on elective and non-emergency surgery waiting lists (the cost has not been quantified) and this clearly impacts on the quality of life of many New Zealanders.

9. Road crashes also reduce the productivity of the workforce. ACC advises that in 2008/09 it paid out over $143 million for lost earnings as a result of road injuries. This figure does not factor in the cost to businesses of employees taking time off work due to road crashes.

10. A further cost to the economy is the impact of congestion caused by road crashes. This can be large, particularly where heavy vehicles are involved and key routes are closed for an extended period.

11. Over the past 35 years, New Zealand's road toll has dropped, while travel has increased. Between 1973 and 2002, the number of people killed on our roads more than halved, despite a doubling in the number of vehicle kilometres travelled. However, progress in reducing road deaths and serious injuries has slowed, with annual road deaths fluctuating between a high of 461 and a low of 365 since 2001. There has also been little improvement in the number of serious injuries sustained on the road, when compared with 2001. The annual cost of all ACC motor vehicle claims over the same period increased 75 percent.

12. Compared to other OECD countries, New Zealand has a relatively high rate of road deaths per head of population. Based on 2008 results, we have 8.6 deaths per 100,000 population. This compares with 6.9 deaths per 100,000 population for Australia. Our road fatality rate is double that of the safest nations (United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands). If New Zealand had the same road fatality rate as

[1] The social cost of a road crash, or a road injury, includes the following: loss of life and life quality, loss of output due to temporary incapacitation, medical costs, legal costs and property damage costs. The 2008 social cost estimates are $3,374,000 for a death, $591,000 for a serious injury and $62,000 for a minor injury.

Australia, in 2009 our road toll would have been 298 instead of 384. Had we had the same fatality rate as United Kingdom, our 2009 road toll would have been 186.

13. It is now clear that the targets of the previous *Road Safety to 2010* strategy of no more than 300 deaths and 2,200 serious injuries by the end of 2010 will not be met. If we continue with our current approach and rely on our existing set of road safety initiatives, it is estimated that in 2020 we will have the same level of road injury and death as now. This means that although we anticipate we will prevent an increase in road trauma due to population growth, there will still be high rates of death and serious injury on our roads.

14. The *Safer Journeys* discussion document was released for public consultation on 18 August 2009 as the first step in developing the government's next road safety strategy. The discussion document outlined the proposed direction for road safety in New Zealand over the next 10 years. It asked the public for feedback on a potential vision for road safety and on adopting a Safe System approach. The discussion document also requested feedback on over 60 potential initiatives across 13 priority areas and asked for any other initiatives the public felt would contribute to the achievement of road safety outcomes.

15. A key reason for progress on road safety over the years has been the development of road safety strategies with coordinated implementation of the strategies' actions. A report on road safety progress since 2000 was released in December that takes a preliminary look at why the road safety targets to 2010 will not be achieved. The report indicates four possible factors that may contribute to the targets not being met.

    15.1. Some legislative changes, which were expected to deliver reductions in social cost, were not progressed.

    15.2. The investment in engineering interventions was not at the level necessary to provide the predicted social cost reductions.

    15.3. There has not been an appreciable reduction in alcohol/drug-related crashes over the last 10 years, despite highly visible enforcement and an increase in the number of breath tests administered.

    15.4. The predicted efficiency gains were not achieved, possibly because mergers in the transport sector have had an impact on the road safety focus of key organisations.

Objective

16. *Safer Journeys* aims to reduce the number of New Zealanders killed and injured as a result of road crashes and make a significant step towards a 'Safe System'.

Regulatory impact analysis

17. The problem definition indicates that while road safety progress has been strong over the last 25 years, progress has slowed over the last five years. A 'step change' is required to reduce the burden of road crashes on the New Zealand economy.

18. To determine what was required to reduce this burden research was completed, including examining countries that have exceptional road safety results. Examination of their road safety strategies indicates that there are three changes required to the strategic framework from the current *Road Safety to 2010* strategy.

    18.1. An ambitious long-term vision for road safety. The existing strategy does not state a vision; instead it relies on targets for reducing deaths and serious injuries.

    18.2. Adopting a system-wide approach to improving road safety rather than only focusing on enforcement, engineering and education.

    18.3. Setting fewer, stronger and more specific priorities for where the road safety effort should be focused.

19. These proposed changes follow the best practice indicated in the OECD publication "Towards Zero: Ambitious Road Safety Targets and the Safe System approach".

The Vision - Towards a safe road system free of death and serious injury

20. *Safer Journeys* proposes the adoption of a long-term vision for the road transport system that challenges us to view road deaths and serious injuries as preventable. In the discussion document the proposed vision was: *A safe road system increasingly free of road deaths and serious injuries*. Feedback from the public and key stakeholders in particular, was that this vision was not ambitious enough. As a result the vision has been strengthened to: *Towards a safe road system free of death and serious injury.*

21. The vision challenges New Zealanders to make a fundamental change in the way they think about road safety. It establishes a long-term aspiration that will help improve efforts to protect road users.

22. The current *Road Safety to 2010* strategy does not have a vision. Instead direction is provided by the headline targets of reducing road trauma to no more than 300 deaths and 4,500 hospitalisations a year by 2010. The lack of a long-term vision in the 2010 strategy was identified as a weakness in the 2004 review of the strategy.

23. On the basis of overseas experience potentially there is much to gain from adopting an ambitious vision. 'Vision Zero' is the vision that applies in the world's best performing road safety jurisdictions,

including Sweden and Norway. As well, both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Health Organization encourage jurisdictions to adopt 'Vision Zero' for road safety.

The Safe System



24. The current *Road Safety to 2010* strategy sets out a framework for advancing road safety through the 'three E's' (education, engineering and enforcement) and six strategic themes. This framework was considered in 2004 to be generally in line with international best practice. However, given that New Zealand's progress towards gains in road safety has slowed we need to strengthen this framework.

25. We will need a significant shift in the way we think about and manage road safety if we are to realise our vision over 2010–2020. Our current approach will at best maintain our existing level of road safety, but it will not deliver progressive reductions in the number of deaths and serious injuries.

26. The Safe System (as illustrated in the previous diagram) differs from traditional approaches to road safety. Rather than blaming the user for causing a crash, it recognises that road users make mistakes and there are limits to the crash forces a human body can tolerate before serious injury or death occurs. In response it aims to provide a road transport system that allows for human error and manages crash energy. It focuses on creating safe roads and roadsides, safe speeds, safe vehicles and safe road users. For example, where a road user makes a mistake they should be able to rely on the travel speed, the road features, and the vehicle to protect them from death and serious injury.

27. The Safe System approach to achieving road safety goals is considered international best practice and is recommended by the OECD. It embraces an ethos of shared responsibility between road users and system designers. It says that if road users are alert and comply with the road rules, then they should be able to rely on the travel speed, the road and roadside features, and the vehicle to protect them from death and serious injury. However, for the Safe System approach to be effective there needs to be strong road safety capability across the transport sector.

28. The Safe System approach was well supported in the consultation. However, submitters placed more emphasis on initiatives that fall within the dimension of safe road use than on roading, vehicle, or speed initiatives. This might indicate that submitters are more focused on the driver, rather than the other three elements of the Safe System.

The Priority Areas

29. To develop a Safe System we need to focus our effort where we can achieve our greatest gains. The strategy outlines 13 areas where current performance needs to be strengthened. These are split into high concern, medium concern and areas of continued focus.

    29.1. High concern: Alcohol/drug impaired driving, young drivers, roads and roadsides, speeds, motorcycling.

    29.2. Medium concern: Light vehicles, walking and cycling, heavy vehicles, fatigue, distraction, high-risk drivers.

    29.3. Continued focus: Restraints, older New Zealanders.

30. High-risk drivers (recidivists, disqualified, unlicensed, high-end offenders and illegal street racers) were presented as an area of continued focus in the discussion document. However, public concern about high-risk drivers came through strongly in the consultation feedback. That is why high-risk drivers are an area of medium concern in *Safer Journeys.*

31. All of the priority areas will require attention over the period 2010–2020. However, relatively more emphasis will be given to the priorities of high concern as this is:

    31.1. where we need to make the most improvement in road safety where a significant change in policy direction, or effort, is required to work towards a Safe System

    31.2. the largest contribution to reducing the costs imposed on the economy by road deaths and injuries (eg reducing the days of productivity lost to the workforce, reducing ACC costs or reducing health sector costs) could be made.

32. The following table provides information on the scale of the problem for the 13 priority areas to help illustrate why each has been classified as either an area of high concern, medium concern or area of continued focus.

Priority level	Priority area	Scale of the problem
High	Increasing the safety of young drivers	In 2008 young drivers were involved in around 37 percent of all fatal crashes and 37 percent of all serious injury crashes. Crashes where young drivers were deemed at fault resulted in 122 deaths and 800 serious injuries in 2008. The social cost of these crashes was $1.1 billion.
	Reducing alcohol/drug impaired driving	In 2008, alcohol and drugs contributed to 31 percent of fatal crashes and 21 percent of serious injury crashes. These crashes resulted in 119 deaths, 572 serious injuries and 1,715 minor injuries. It is estimated that the social cost of crashes where alcohol/drugs were a factor was $833 million in 2008.
	Safer roads and roadsides	Safer roads are a critical part of a safe system as they reduce crashes, but more importantly they also reduce the consequences of crashes. Road improvements contributed to an estimated 11 percent drop in rural road deaths from 1997 to 2005.
	Safer Speeds	In 2008, 127 people died, 560 were seriously injured and 2,049 received minor injuries in crashes where speed was a contributing factor. The social cost of these crashes was $867 million
	Increasing the safety of motorcycling	In 2008, 52 motorcyclists were killed, 466 were seriously injured and 1,024 suffered minor injuries. This represents 14 percent of all road deaths and 18 percent of all serious injuries. The total social cost of crashes involving motorcyclists in 2008 was $587million.
Medium	Improving the safety of the light vehicle fleet	Safer vehicles are a critical part of a safe system because they reduce both the number of crashes and their severity. Vehicle improvements have been estimated to reduce road deaths by 15% between 1997 and 2005. New Zealand has a relatively old vehicle fleet, which means our vehicles are less safe than those in other countries.
	Safer walking and cycling	In 2008, 10 cyclists were killed, 186 were seriously injured and 709 received minor injuries. The social cost of these crashes was

		$224 million. (This excludes the social cost of the 1800 cyclists who were hospitalised for crashes not involving a motor vehicle, most of which were on public roads) In 2008, 31 pedestrians were killed, 261 were seriously injured and 678 received minor injuries. The social cost of these crashes was $342 million. (This excludes the social cost of the approximately 400 pedestrians who were hospitalised due to trips and falls on the road or footpath)
Medium	Improving the safety of heavy vehicles	In 2008, crashes involving heavy vehicles accounted for 18 percent of road deaths and 19 percent of total injuries. This equates to 65 deaths, 258 serious injuries and 1,144 minor injuries with a social cost of $476 million
	Reducing the impact of fatigue	In 2008 fatigue related crashes resulted in 190 serious injuries and 42 deaths. It is estimated that the social cost of crashes involving fatigue in 2008 was $312 million.
	Addressing distraction	In 2008 distraction related crashes resulted in 243 serious injuries and 42 deaths. It is estimated that the social cost of crashes involving distraction in 2008 was $411 million
	Reducing the impact of high-risk drivers	In 2008 high risk drivers caused 1,030 minor injuries, 300 serious injuries, and 51 fatalities. The total social cost of these crashes was at least $410 million for 2008.
Continued Focus	Increasing the level of restraint use	For drivers and passengers in cars, vans, SUVs, taxis and trucks in 2008 there were 64 deaths, 135 serious injuries and 282 minor injuries where the person killed or injured was not wearing a seatbelt where available. This results in a social cost of $328 million for these casualties.
	Increasing the safety of older New Zealanders	Older road users have a road fatality rate of 15 per 100,000 population. This compares with 11 per 100,000 for older Australians..

Possible actions

33. The package of possible actions in the strategy takes into account public feedback, research and evidence. These are the initiatives most likely to make the greatest impact in addressing the road crash problem at this time. Over the lifetime of the strategy officials will consider new evidence and research to make decisions on the best possible actions. The actions in the strategy are not a list of everything that could be done to improve road safety over 2010–2020. But they are the key new actions that are likely to help bridge the gap between where we are

now and a safe road transport system. A number of proven current actions that offer value for money will continue.

34. As illustrated in the table over the page, preliminary regulatory impact analysis has been completed for each of the first regulatory actions in the *Safer Journeys* strategy. This list of actions focuses on four of the areas of high concern – increasing the safety of young drivers, reducing alcohol/drug impaired driving, safer roads and roadsides and increasing the safety of motorcycling. It also focuses on the new medium area of concern - high risk drivers - through the young drivers and alcohol/drug impaired driving actions.

35. The table includes potential benefits as well as some initial cost estimates, where known, for these actions. The Ministry will carry out further comprehensive regulatory impact analyses for each package of regulatory initiatives progressed as part of the strategy when they are provided to Cabinet for approval. Costs may be reduced if actions are packaged and sequenced accordingly.

36. Non-regulatory initiatives will also be subject to further analysis to ensure that they can be effectively implemented. This analysis will be provided to Cabinet as they consider each package of initiatives. Further to this, those actions that require funding changes need to satisfy the funding requirements of the National Land Transport Programme.

Increasing the Safety of Young Drivers – Raise the minimum driving age to 16 and extend the length of the learner licence period from six to twelve months

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: Young drivers (defined as drivers in the 15 to 24 year age group) in New Zealand have one of the worst road safety records in the OECD. Part of the reason for this is that we have one of the lowest minimum driving ages and subsequently lowest ages at which young drivers can drive solo or unsupervised (the highest risk period). In 2008, young drivers made up 16 percent of all licensed drivers but were involved in 37 percent of both fatal and serious injury crashes. This resulted in 122 deaths and 800 serious injuries. The social cost was estimated at $1.1 billion, 30 percent of the total social cost for all crashes. The road fatality rate for young people in 2007 was 21 per 100,000 population, more than twice as high as for the whole population (10 per 100,000 population). This compares with a fatality rate of 13 per 100,000 population for young Australians. **Options:** 1. Status quo 2. *Raise the minimum driving age to 16 years of age and extend the length of the learner licence period from six to twelve months* 3. Raise the minimum driving age to 17 years old 4. Introduce vehicle restriction for young drivers 5. Secondary school road safety education	**Ministry recommended solution:** The recommended option is to implement a package of change, which includes raising the minimum driving age (includes motorcyclists) to at least 16 years and extending the learner licence period from six to twelve months. The general framework of the Graduated Driver Licensing System (GDLS) has been evaluated as being effective and in line with latest best practice in reducing the crash risk of young and novice drivers. Research shows that risk to young drivers can be reduced by two factors: increased age when beginning driving solo and greater supervised driving hours before driving solo. Therefore changes within the GDLS framework, to bring it closer to best practice, are the best option. **Preliminary cost estimates:** The driver licensing system, administered by the NZ Transport Agency (NZTA), would require IT development to make these changes, it estimates the cost to be between $500,000 and $800,000. This cost does not include transitional arrangements yet to be scoped for those 15 and 16 years old already in the GDLS system when the law changes come into effect. There are potential IT costs for the New Zealand Police (Police) depending on the nature of NZTA's IT development requirements. There could also be IT implications for the Ministry of Justice (Justice). The potential is for costs both at the

Intervention logic: An older minimum driving age as well as a longer period of supervised learner driving will help compensate for the late maturing of young people's cognitive abilities, which include visual scanning and hazard detection, as well as allow more time for supervised practice. This will reduce the high crash risk of young and novice drivers and so reduce the level of death and injury caused by this road user group. This is in line with international best practice.	individual agency level, as well as collective costs across the agencies. There will be impact on the NZTA's revenue from 3rd party fees in the year/s following implementation to fund the operation of the licensing systems initially estimated to be between $5 million - $9 million over three years for raising the age to 16. These figures would be greater if the minimum driving age was increased to 17 and also depends on transitional arrangements for learners already in the system. There will also be a loss of revenue for driver licensing agents. Compensation would be payable under current contractual arrangements. The NZTA may also be faced with reimbursing driver testing agents for severance costs where testing at smaller regional locations may no longer be sustainable. Revised fees or new funding arrangements will be required to accommodate these additional costs. Most of the risks would be short term, during the transition phase from the current system to the proposed system. The impacts would mainly affect NZTA and its agents' capacity, costs and revenue streams. For example, there may be a short period of overloading the system with demand for learner licences for those aged 15 or 16, so that they enter the system before any changes occur. There will also be costs incurred by NZTA to educate the public of the change, as well as amend publications and websites. This is estimated to be approximately $2 million.

	There are also enforcement costs that will need to be considered, in particular for Police Infringement Bureau and Prosecutions. There are likely consequences of an increase in the number of impoundments (and associated costs), as well as driver licence suspensions and driving while suspended/driving while forbidden. Justice sector costs will also need to be considered. There may be some costs to young people and their families in terms of reduced mobility and employment opportunities. However, recent research has indicated increasing the minimum age for licensing would have relatively little impact on essential travel among young people in New Zealand[2]. **Anticipated outcomes:** It is estimated that raising the minimum driving age (includes motorcyclists) to 16 years and extending the learner licence period from six to twelve months will save 10 lives and prevent 57 serious injuries and 345 minor injuries each year. This equates to an annual social cost saving of $89 million. Raising the minimum driving age (includes motorcyclists) to 17 years and extending the learner licence period from six to twelve months is estimated to save 18 lives and prevent 109 serious injuries and 656 minor injuries each year. This equates to an annual social cost saving of $166 million. There is a risk that 15 and 16 year-old drivers may refuse to comply with the new requirements. This can be mitigated by educating the public on the reasons for the change. It links with another of the proposals in *Safer Journeys*, which is to raise

[2] New Zealand Drivers Study: a follow-up study of newly licensed drivers. D.J Begg, J.D. Langley, R.L. Brookland, J. R. Broughton, S. Ameratunga, A.J. McDowell. Injury Prevention Research Unit, Dunedin School of Medicine, University of Otago

	public awareness of young driver crash risk.

Increasing the Safety of Young Drivers – Make the restricted licence test more difficult to encourage at least 120 hours of supervised driving practice in the learner licence phase

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: Young New Zealanders aged 15 to 24 years are 14.5 percent of New Zealand's population and 16 percent of all licensed drivers. Yet in 2008 they were involved in around 37 percent of all fatal crashes and 37 percent of all serious injury crashes. Research shows that young driver crash risk is highest when they first begin driving unsupervised. Although there is evidence that this increase in crash risk is evident regardless of age, this increased crash risk is most pronounced for those aged 15 to 16 years[3]. That the risk increases so significantly when solo driving is first undertaken, indicates independent on-road driving experience plays an important role in crash risk. Currently learner drivers in New Zealand are estimated to do around 50 hours of supervised practice. This is much lower than the 120 hours that is international best practice. **Options:** 1. Status quo *2. Make the restricted driver licence test more difficult to encourage 120 hours of supervised driving practice in the learner licence phase* 3. Mandate 120 hours of supervised driving practice in the learner licence phase with the introduction of log-books	**Ministry recommended solution:** The recommended option is to make the restricted driver licence test more difficult to encourage 120 hours of supervised driving practice in the learner licence phase. The test will place more emphasis on skills such as hazard perception and risk management. The intention is that to be able to pass the test, novice drivers will need to have done substantially more supervised practice than the current 50 hours average. To increase the effectiveness of this initiative a public awareness campaign would be carried out to explain why supervised practice is important, and why we have licence conditions for novice drivers (eg restrictions on night time driving and carrying peer passengers). A review and improvement of the road safety education available to young people is also necessary. **Preliminary cost estimates:** There would be some costs to the NZTA in developing the restricted licence test so it is line with best practice and achieves the objective of encouraging 120 hours supervised driving practice. If the practical restricted test is to be extended, it is likely that the current 30 minute test duration will not be sufficient, requiring

[3] OECD (2006). *Young Drivers: The Road to Safety*, p. 127

4. Encourage young drivers to undertake driver training **Intervention logic:** Supervised practice reduces crash risk by helping young drivers gain driving experience in a range of conditions (eg at night, in the rain) before getting a restricted licence and driving solo. It has an important role in helping develop safe driving skills and responsible attitudes. New Zealand's level of supervised practice for learner drivers is estimated at around 50 hours on average. Strengthening the restricted licence test will create an incentive to encourage increased supervised practice. Experience overseas suggests there could be up to a 40 percent reduction in crash risk for those young drivers that undertake 120 hours of supervised practice in all conditions before taking the restricted licence test. Such a reduction would translate to savings in young driver-related deaths and injuries.	funding of additional testing officer time. IT changes will also be required to amend the driver licence test booking system so that a longer appointment time can be scheduled when the restricted practical test is booked. There will also be the costs of the public awareness campaign to raise awareness of young driver crash risk and the reasons why supervised practice is important. This is yet to be scoped but could be combined with publicity on other young driver licence changes. There may be some costs to young people and their supervisors in terms of the time commitment to practising driving. There may be a loss of convenience for some learners as appropriate practice and testing sites (eg traffic flow, road condition) may not be readily available in all locations. There may be increased costs for Police and Justice in terms of the number of fines imposed and the impact on the courts. **Anticipated outcomes:** Providing accompanied driving at the learner phase is current best recommended practice (OECD, 2006). An increased emphasis on the actual skill level required for proficient driving (through the awareness campaign and testing requirements) would be expected to contribute to improved driver attitudes to safety. Implementing this initiative will move New Zealand into line with OECD best practice. It will mean our younger drivers have more

	driving experience when they first drive solo (the highest crash risk period). There is insufficient research evidence to provide an estimate of lives saved and injuries prevented at this stage. However, a number of jurisdictions (including most Australian states) have recently either mandated or encourage 120 hours supervised driving in the learner licence phase. Their initial experience combined with the intervention logic suggests a reduction in crashes. Further evaluation is under way. There is a risk that young drivers will not receive adequate support from supervisors to gain 120 hours. This risk will be reduced by having a public awareness campaign to explain why supervised practice is important and providing supporting material. There could also be an increase in the number of people driving unlicensed if the restricted licence test is made more difficult. This could be minimised by including better opportunities for accessing professional driving lessons for people from varying demographics.

Increasing the Safety of Young Drivers – Lower the youth blood alcohol limit (for drivers under 20 years) from 30 mg alcohol/100ml blood to zero

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: Through the 1990s substantial progress was made in reducing the number of alcohol-related road deaths and serious injuries. However, since 2000 no further progress has been made and the level of deaths and serious injuries is now higher than it was in 2000.	**Ministry recommended solution:** It is proposed to reduce the youth (drivers under 20 years) legal blood alcohol concentration[5] limit for driving from 30 mg alcohol/100ml blood to zero (implemented with an enforcement tolerance).

Based on the roadside alcohol survey[4] there has been a clear increase in drink driving among 15 to 19 year-olds. A higher proportion of young people are now driving while over the legal limit. The crash risk for young drivers rises significantly even at very low BAC levels. At the existing BAC of 0.03 the risk of a 15 to 19 year-old driver being involved in a fatal crash increases by 15 times compared with a sober driver aged over 30. **Options:** 1. Status quo 2. *Lower the youth blood alcohol limit (for drivers under 20 years) from 30 mg alcohol/100ml blood to zero* 3. Maintain the existing limit and increase the severity of penalties 4. Promote the voluntary use of alcohol interlocks. **Intervention logic:** By setting the legal youth BAC limit to zero (implemented with an enforcement tolerance) we are likely to reduce the incidence of drink driving among young drivers. We will also contribute to creating a culture of sober drivers as young drivers used to a zero limit become adult drivers. This change is likely to reduce the level of deaths and serious injuries caused by alcohol impaired driving.	**Preliminary cost estimates:** The types of costs are the same as for lowering the adult limit (outlined on the next page) and have been subsumed within that estimate. **Anticipated outcomes:** It is estimated that lowering the youth limit to BAC zero would save two lives and prevent 43 injuries every year. This corresponds to an estimated annual social cost saving of $16.5 million. (NB: Alcohol related crashes of 20-24 year olds would be reduced by lowering the adult BAC limit).

[5] Blood alcohol concentration is the amount of alcohol present in a 100 millilitre (mL) volume of blood.
[4] The survey is conducted every second year by the Police using their random breath testing operations. Data is collected from all Police districts and the operations occur at randomly selected sites during the hours of 10pm to 2am.

Reducing alcohol/drug impaired driving - Lower the legal adult blood alcohol concentration limit for driving from 80mg alcohol/100ml blood, to 50mg alcohol/100ml blood

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: Through the 1990s substantial progress was made in reducing the number of alcohol-related road deaths and serious injuries. However, since 2000 no further progress has been made and the level of deaths and serious injuries is now higher than it was in 2000. In 2008, alcohol contributed to 31 percent of fatal crashes and 21 percent of serious injury crashes. It is estimated that the social cost[6] of crashes where alcohol was a factor was $833 million in 2008. **Options:** 1. Status quo 2. *Lower the legal adult blood alcohol concentration[7] limit for driving from 80mg alcohol/100ml blood, to 50mg alcohol/100ml blood and introduce infringement penalties for the new offences* 3. Maintain the existing limit and increase the severity of penalties 4. Promote the voluntary use of alcohol interlocks 5. Establish the level of crashes that are caused by drivers with a BAC between 0.05 - 0.08. **Intervention logic:**	**Ministry recommended solution:** It is proposed to reduce the adult legal blood alcohol concentration limit for driving from 80mg alcohol/100ml blood (BAC 0.08), to 50mg alcohol/100ml blood (BAC 0.05) and introduce infringement penalties for the new offences. **Preliminary cost estimates:** To give effect to a lower adult limit and a lower youth limit, the Police would face an additional estimated cost pressure of between $2. million and $7. million, which would have implications for the National Land Transport Programme (NLTP) from which road policing is funded. Justice sector costs also need to be considered. The NZTA would also face costs of up to $1 million for a nationwide television advertising campaign and potentially costs of updating relevant printed material e.g. the Road Code. If infringement penalties are introduced for offences below BAC 0.08 there would be costs for the NZTA associated with processing an increased number of demerit points, vehicle impoundments and in the surrendering and re-issuing of driver licences. These increased costs may need to be reflected in fee increases. The fees for obtaining a licence in New Zealand are currently lower than those in most Australian states.

[6] The social cost of a road crash, or a road injury, includes the following: loss of life and life quality, loss of output due to temporary incapacitation, medical costs, legal costs and property damage costs. The 2008 social cost estimates are $3,374,000 for a death, $591,000 for a serious injury and $62,000 for a minor injury.

[7] Blood alcohol concentration is the amount of alcohol present in a 100 millilitre (mL) volume of blood.

The current adult limit was set in 1978. Since then the link between alcohol consumption and driving impairment has been very well established. Compared to a sober driver, a driver aged over 30 with a BAC of 0.08 is 16.5 times more likely to have a fatal crash and 5.8 times more likely with a BAC of 0.05. Drivers aged between 20 and 29 years are 50.2 times more likely to have a fatal crash at BAC 0.08 compared to 17.5 times as likely at BAC 0.05. There are nearly 300 studies that look at the impairment effects of alcohol at different levels of BAC. This research concludes that impairment starts at very low BACs and the vast majority of drivers are affected or impaired at a BAC of 0.05, with significant impairment at BAC 0.08. Our current limit allows a man of average height and weight to consume six standard drinks within 90 minutes. For a woman[8] it allows four standard drinks to be consumed. Further between BAC 0.05 and BAC 0.08, within our current legal limit, a person is ability to make a judgement about whether they are fit to drive is significantly impaired. By setting the legal adult BAC at 0.05 we are likely to reduce the amount of alcohol consumed by drivers prior to driving. This is likely to reduce the level of deaths and serious injuries caused by alcohol impaired driving.	There are also enforcement costs that will need to be considered, in particular for Police Infringement Bureau and Prosecutions. There are likely consequences of an increase in the number of Police prosecutions, as well as an increase in fines collection. An increase in prosecution/apprehension costs associated with driving while suspended is also anticipated. **Anticipated outcomes:** Lowering the adult drink drive limit would be the strongest initiative in the area of Safe Road Use. It is estimated that each year this initiative could save between 15 and 30 lives and prevent between 320 and 686 injuries. This would be an annual social cost saving of between $111 million and $238 million.

Reducing alcohol/drug impaired driving - Address recidivism and high level offending through:

- *compulsory alcohol interlocks*

[8] Also of average height and weight – people process alcohol at different rates and these estimates are only guides.

- *a zero drink drive limit for offenders*

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: In 2008, alcohol contributed to 31 percent of fatal crashes and 21 percent of serious injury crashes. It is estimated that the social cost of crashes where alcohol was a factor was $833 million in 2008. Fines and licence disqualification work well in deterring most people from drink driving. However, this is not true for all drivers. Every year there are approximately 30,000 convictions for drink driving offences. Currently, 23 percent of drink drivers are re-offenders. **Options:** 1. Status quo. 2. Increase the severity of the existing fines, length of licence disqualification periods and length of prison terms. *3. Compulsory alcohol interlocks and a zero BAC limit for drink drive offenders.* 4. A zero BAC limit for drink drive offenders. 5. Compulsory alcohol interlocks for drink drive offenders. **Intervention logic:** Drink drive offenders pose a significant road safety risk. By stopping offenders from re-offending this would contribute to lowering the level of deaths and serious injuries caused by alcohol impaired driving.	**Ministry recommended solution:** Move towards the compulsory use of alcohol interlocks for drink drive offenders. An alcohol interlock is a device similar to a breathalyser that is connected to the engine's ignition system. Before the vehicle can be started, the driver is required to breathe into the device. If the analysed result is over a programmed breath-alcohol level, the vehicle will not start. Interlocks can also require subsequent breath tests while the vehicle's engine is running. The purpose of a subsequent retest is to make sure that a drunk driver does not ask another person to start the vehicle for them or that the driver does not start the journey sober and drink while driving. We would also look to impose a zero BAC drink drive limit on repeat offenders and high BAC level first-time offenders. Although the existing sanction of licence disqualification and the new initiative of alcohol interlocks would mean that drink drive offenders cannot drink and drive, a zero BAC limit would increase the effectiveness of these two sanctions. It would send a strong message that drink driving poses a significant risk to the safety of New Zealanders. **Preliminary cost estimates:** In theory alcohol interlock programmes operate on a user pays basis. Based on the Australian programmes, the cost of an interlock in New Zealand could be around $200 per month. This is per individual and does not include the operating overheads

	for the scheme. An estimate of the number of alcohol interlocks per year will need to be made to determine the overall costs. There would be some costs involved in tagging the licences of offenders as zero BAC if the period of licence disqualification, or required use of an alcohol interlock, is shorter than the period of being subject to a zero BAC limit. In addition there are significant enforcement and prosecution costs. Justice sector costs will also need to be considered. Costs to NZTA associated with implementation of compulsory alcohol interlocks for drink drive offenders have yet to be scoped. These will include IT changes to the DLR, agent costs, administrative costs to handle surrendered licences, updating the DLR, and handling offender enquiries. There are also significant impacts on the Road Policing Programme which could impact on the NLTP. Consideration of financial assistance through the benefit system for those unable to afford interlocks is likely to be necessary. **Anticipated outcomes:** It is estimated that interlocks could save between two and seven lives each year and prevent between 32 and128 injuries (depending on whether interlocks are applied from the first or second offence, whether they are installed for one year or two years, and whether a lifetime definition of repeat offender or a five-year definition is used). There are many social benefits from allowing a person to continue to drive with an interlock. Most importantly, it puts a physical barrier in the vehicle to stop drink driving. As opposed

	to disqualification, interlocks have a reduced impact on an offender's employment, family and community commitments. By allowing people to keep driving, they can remain in employment, stay connected to the community, and access the educational, assessment and treatment services that are required to manage their alcohol consumption before leaving the interlock programme. If interlocks and a zero BAC for drink drive offenders are not introduced, then it is expected that the current level of re-offending will continue. This in turn will mean that the current level of alcohol-related road deaths and serious injuries involving offenders will continue.

Increasing the safety of motorcycling - Improved rider training and licensing

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: The risk of a motorcyclist being killed or seriously injured in a crash is about 16 times higher than for a car driver. Motorcyclists are over-represented in the crash statistics. In 2008, 50 motorcyclists were killed, 456 were seriously injured and a further 940 suffered minor injuries. Novice motorcyclists, a growing proportion of which are in the over-30 age group, have a higher crash risk than experienced motorcyclists. This crash risk is greatest in the first 12 months of riding. Riders of low-powered motorcycles (mopeds) are becoming more prominent in the crash statistics. Motorcycles under 50cc have increased from about 11 percent of all reported crashes in	**Ministry recommended solution:** Strengthen the basic handling skills test, the restricted, and the full motorcycle licence practical tests. The strengthened tests will encourage novice riders to access training in the learner phase. This would mean that key skills, such as hazard perception, could be taught when riders are most at risk (ie in the first twelve months of riding). To support this, approved training courses will be made available to those on learner motorcycle licences (currently they are only available in the restricted phase). Also require moped riders, who currently only require a car licence, to pass the upgraded basic handling skills test and a moped-specific theory test. This will ensure moped riders have the basic skills necessary to ride on the road. **Preliminary cost estimates:**

2000 to around 20 percent in 2007. ACC claim figures illustrate a similar pattern. **Options:** 1. Status quo 2. *Improve rider training and licensing, plus incorporate moped riders* 3. Mandate training for all motorcyclists 4. Promote high visibility and protective clothing to riders **Intervention logic:** Motorcycle and moped riding requires higher levels of both vehicle control and cognitive skills than car driving and the potential outcomes of any failure on the part of the rider, other road users, or the road environment are severe. Improving the rider training and licensing regime for motorcyclists and moped riders is considered current best practice as it acknowledges the distinctive needs of these road users compared to car drivers and will reduce their high crash risk. A number of Australian states encourage motorcycle/moped training and have separate graduated licensing systems for cars and motorcycles.	Assuming the existing DLR/MVR IT platform is still in use at the time of implementation, the NZTA estimates the information technology systems changes required to implement this proposal will be between $400,000 and $700,000. This does not include the IT implications of requiring moped riders to pass the upgraded basic handling skills test and a moped-specific theory test, which have yet to be estimated. These costs could be reduced if the changes are made in conjunction with other *Safer Journeys* initiatives. There are potential IT costs for Police depending on the nature of NZTA's IT development requirements. There could also be IT implications for Justice. The potential is for costs both at the individual agency level, as well as collective costs across the agencies. There will also be costs incurred by the NZTA to educate riders, amend publications and websites, re-train staff, develop the new tests and create new operational guidelines. These are yet to be scoped. Training the trainers would also be required (along with ensuring the trainer skills are maintained over time). Strengthening the tests will mean a greater number of riders will fail. Re-sitting the tests and additional training will come at a cost to the riders themselves. Also moped riders will now have to pay to take the basic handling skills test and a moped-specific theory test. There are also enforcement costs that will need to be considered, in particular for Police Infringement Bureau and Prosecutions. It is expected that ticket numbers will increase, and there will be additional increases in fines collection.

	Anticipated outcomes: If no action is taken, then it is expected that the current level of motorcycle related road trauma will continue to increase. Based on current trends, without any new road safety measures ACC estimates that its motorcycle injury claim costs could increase from $70 million in 2010 to about $114 million in 2020. By increasing rider competence before permitting people to ride on public roads, it is believed that the risk for novice riders will be lowered. It is not possible to provide an estimate on the likely road safety benefits of this initiative as reviews conclude that there is a lack of scientific and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of motorcycle training or specific components of motorcycle training that reduce crash risk, fatalities and injuries (Austroads Handbook, 2003; MUARC 2005; Elvik and Vaa, 2006; Christie, 2008). This is at least partly due to the methodological difficulties in conducting research in this area. However, current recommended best practice is to still include hazard perception training (which holds promise) and to increase emphasis on road craft (without reducing the time spent on vehicle control skills) at the learner and other licence levels. In terms of requiring moped riders to pass a basic handling and theory test, the MUARC (2005) review of motorcycle licensing and training suggests that best practice includes off-road testing to obtain a L licence and on-road testing to obtain a R licence, and this is expected to have a positive road safety benefit. The review, however, does not provide any indication of the likely size of the benefit. Elvik and Vaa (2006) cite one specific study

	from Australia that found a 13% reduction in rider crashes from introducing compulsory driving tests combined with training for motorcycles. Unfortunately it is not clear whether the reduction in rider crashes was due to improvements in rider crash risk or exposure. At present, assuming the moped rider does not already have a motorcycle licence, requiring basic handling and skills testing in line with best practice (when there are currently none provided) is likely to have a small road safety benefit. If we assume that the 13% reduction from Elvik and Vaa (2006) can be applied as an indication of the maximum reduction in rider accidents achievable then such an initiative is estimated to save one fatality and between 2 and 5 serious injuries per year. There is a risk that there will not be enough quality motorcycle-specific trainers to cope with the demand for training courses. There will need to be an increase in capacity prior to the changes with monitoring of the sector over time.

Increasing the safety of motorcycling - Change the 250cc restriction for learner motorcycle riders to a combined power-to-weight ratio of 150kw per tonne and 660cc restriction

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: The risk of a motorcyclist being killed or seriously injured in a crash is about 16 times higher than for a car driver. Part of the reason for this is that motorcycles and mopeds have less stability, offer lower levels of occupant protection, and are less visible to other road users. Motorcyclists are over-represented in the crash statistics. In 2008, 50 motorcyclists were killed, 456 were seriously injured	**Ministry recommended solution:** Improve the safety of novice riders by restricting learner and restricted motorcycle licence holders to motorcycles which do not exceed a power-to-weight ratio of 150 kilowatts per tonne. In addition to the power-to-weight limit an upper bound of 660cc is proposed to ensure that the approved motorcycles are not too physically large for novice riders. A number of Australian states have recognised the 250cc novice

and a further 940 suffered minor injuries. The 250cc restriction for learner and restricted motorcycle licence holders no longer accurately reflects the power capabilities of modern motorcycles. Further to this, despite the rule, in the period 2003 to 2007 ten percent of riders on learner licences, and 19 percent of riders on restricted licences, were riding bikes of over 250cc at the time of their crashes. **Options:** 1. Status quo 2. *Change the 250cc restriction for learner riders to a combined power-to-weight ratio of 150kw per tonne and 660cc restriction* 3. Require all new motorcycles to have anti-lock braking systems from a particular date 4. Promote high visibility and protective clothing **Intervention logic:** Currently holders of learner and restricted motorcycle licences are restricted to riding motorcycles of 250cc and less. This is because crashes involving larger and more powerful bikes are more likely to result in death and serious injury than crashes involving lower powered bikes. However, recent advances in technology are limiting the effectiveness of the restriction. A number of powerful high-performance 250cc motorcycles capable of high speeds and rapid acceleration are available on the market. These motorcycles are not suitable for novice riders due to their power, riding position and handling. The trend for increases in	rider restriction as a safety issue and have replaced this with a power-to-weight restriction through the introduction of a Learner Approved Motorcycle Scheme (LAMS). This LAMS list could readily be adapted for use in New Zealand. **Preliminary cost estimates:** Assuming the existing DLR IT platform is still in use at the time of implementation, the NZTA estimates the DLR information technology systems changes required to implement this proposal will be between $250,000 and $400,000. The impacts on the MVR are still to be determined. These costs could be reduced if the changes are made in conjunction with other *Safer Journeys* initiatives. There are potential IT costs for Police depending on the nature of NZTA's IT development requirements. There could also be IT implications for Justice. The potential is for costs both at the individual agency level, as well as collective costs across the agencies. There will also be costs incurred by the NZTA to educate riders, amend publications and websites, re-train staff, develop new operational guidelines, as well as create and maintain the new approved motorcycle power-to-weight LAMS list. There may be a cost to some novice riders who must buy a new motorcycle if their current one does not comply with the new restriction. However, this could be limited by having a transitional period from the current restriction to the new one for current learner and restricted licence holders. There are enforcement costs for Police, relating in the main to

motorcycle power are likely to continue.	Police Information Bureau (PIB) processing. **Anticipated outcomes:** This restriction will give novice riders access to a greater range of motorcycles appropriate for their level of experience, including more that have safety features like automatic braking systems. It will also provide a more progressive step to larger bikes than the 250cc restriction. Evidence from overseas jurisdictions shows a power-to-weight restriction encourages novice riders to stay on a less powerful bike for longer than a 250cc restriction after their restriction period ends. This is positive for safety as familiarity with a motorcycle reduces crash risk. It is not yet possible to determine the magnitude of benefit in terms of lives saved and injuries prevented for this initiative due to a lack of evaluation. However, this restriction is considered best practice and is in place in most Australian states. There is a risk that motorcyclists will continue to ride their high-powered 250cc bikes. This risk could be reduced by placing a code on the registration label to aid enforcement and having an approved motorcycle list published on the internet to aid prospective buyers.

Safer roads and roadsides - Change the give way rules for turning traffic

Problem, options and intervention logic	Recommended solution – Initial Impact Analysis
Problem: Currently 21 percent of fatal crashes occur at intersections. The majority of fatal intersection crashes occur in rural areas, but the majority of serious injury crashes are in urban areas. Intersection crashes are often caused by poor judgement, which	**Ministry recommended solution:** Change the current give way rule to require traffic turning right to give way to traffic turning left into the same road. **Preliminary cost estimates:** This would be a major rule change so it would require an

is exacerbated by the current give-way rules for turning traffic. The current give way rules[9] place complex demands on road users. Currently, a driver turning left has to: • check if there are any right-turning vehicles to give way to • check if there is any traffic coming from behind which will delay the right-turning vehicle, and • check for cyclists alongside the vehicle and pedestrians crossing the road they are entering. So the driver has to check in three different directions; the situation opposite them; behind them; and on the road they are entering – all within seconds. It is even harder if there is no give way or stop sign on a terminating road. This situation creates the following crash risks: • between left-turning vehicles and pedestrians crossing the road that the vehicle is turning into, or cyclists on the inside, because of the driver of the vehicle watching for right-turning traffic • between right-turning vehicles and left-turning vehicles • between right-turning vehicles and vehicles overtaking the left-turning vehicles. **Options:** 1. Status quo *2. Change the give way rules for turning traffic* 3. Continue advertising aimed at raising awareness of	extensive publicity and education campaign. This could cost NZTA up to $2 million and would include costs for education, publicity and reprinting publications (Road code, licence tests) depending on timing. It could also cost up to $1 million to make discretionary improvements to the road network to maximise its efficiency under the new rule, if this work was prioritised (eg to re-phase some traffic signals and change road markings). Our initial analysis indicates that the benefits of this proposal substantially exceed the costs. Signage for uncontrolled intersections is likely to be simpler and decrease in cost over the long term. There are also cost implications for PIB processing, although these are minor in nature. **Anticipated outcomes:** Based on the experience in Victoria a reduction of about 7 percent of relevant intersection crashes, which translates into a social cost saving of $17 million annually, could be expected. This is due to certain types of intersection crashes reducing as a result of less complex decision making for road users. One possible risk is an increase in the number of crashes immediately following the rule change. This might occur if some people are aware of the rule changes while others are not. However, it is also likely that people would be more cautious following the change if it is heavily publicised. There are very few case studies to go on, but when they made a

[9] The current give way rules are; if turning, give way to all traffic not turning, and in all other situations, give way to traffic crossing or approaching from the right.

intersection safety **Intervention logic:** Changing this give way rule would make intersection decisions much easier (including at T-junctions). The State of Victoria achieved a 7 percent reduction in relevant intersection crashes when it completed this change in 1993, which is a social cost saving of about $17 million annually (if this gain occurred in New Zealand). When Victoria made this change the resulting reduction in crashes exceeded initial expectations and contrary to some predictions there was no increase in crashes in the period immediately following the rule change.	similar rule change in Victoria the predicted increase in crashes did not eventuate. Risks can be mitigated by a good publicity campaign, which was considered a key reason behind the successful transition in Victoria.

Consultation

37. The *Safer Journeys* discussion document was launched on 18 August 2009. The consultation period closed on 2 October 2009. During the consultation period, Ministry of Transport (Ministry) officials attended over 40 meetings across New Zealand, including Regional Transport Committee meetings and meetings with road safety coordinators and specific interest groups like walking and cycling advocates. The *Safer Journeys* website contained an online forum, where people could exchange their views on the different priority areas and *Safer Journeys* in general. Almost 400 people joined the forum and posted more than 1,000 notes.

38. Key road safety stakeholders were consulted with before the development of the discussion document, and they received copies of the discussion document as soon as it was released. The Ministry's stakeholder engagement team worked with stakeholders across the country to highlight the consultation to ensure they were aware and prepared, should they want to make a submission. The consultation was promoted on the Ministry of Transport website and websites of other government agencies and some key stakeholders

39. More than 1,500 submissions were received on the *Safer Journeys* discussion document (general public about 1,400 and stakeholders almost 130). In addition, more than 1,200 members of the general public and almost 20 key stakeholders ranked the 62 initiatives outlined in the discussion document. This is a much higher number of submissions than was received on the *Road Safety to 2010* strategy (about 800).

40. The Ministry of Youth development also received 310 submissions on the *Safer Journeys* youth document (264 from individuals and 46 from groups). The Law Commission provided the 1350 submissions they received on the proposal to the lower the adult drink drive limit from consultation on *Alcohol in Our Lives.*

41. Some of the more controversial initiatives in the discussion document received strong support from submitters (ie they were highly ranked), including initiatives about lowering the legal Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) limit for adults, raising the minimum driving age and changing the give way rule.

42. A few initiatives gained high support from submitters but are not strongly supported by policy and research, like the introduction of compulsory third party vehicle insurance (ranked 1st). A recent survey found the number of uninsured private vehicles in New Zealand is 7.6 percent. This is not as high as first thought and indicates that New Zealand's level of uninsured vehicles is comparable with other jurisdictions, including those with compulsory insurance regimes

43. The *Safer Journeys* strategy has been endorsed by the National Road Safety Committee (NRSC). The NRSC comprises the Secretary for Transport, the Commissioner of Police, and the Chief Executives of the New Zealand Transport Agency, the Accident Compensation Corporation, and Local Government New Zealand. The Chief Executives of the Ministries of Health, Education, Justice and the Department of Labour are associate members.

44. The following government agencies were also consulted in the development of this paper and the attached strategy, and their views, if any, were incorporated: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Department of Internal Affairs, Office for Senior Citizens, Office for Disability Issues, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, Ministry of Youth Development, Ministry of Social Development, Te Puni Kōkiri, Ministry of Tourism, and The Treasury. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was informed.

Conclusions and recommendations

45. *Safer Journeys* proposes a step change by adopting a Safe System approach. It also proposes an ambitious long-term vision for road safety: *Towards a safe road system free of death and serious injury,* and outlines the priority areas where the road safety effort should be focused over the next 10 years. These changes will move New Zealand towards the best practices of the best performing road safety nations.

46. *Safer Journeys* contains a series of initiatives designed to collectively target the various crash factors that currently cause serious road trauma and make a significant step towards a 'Safe System'. It takes into account public feedback, as well as road safety research and evidence. It also takes into account the factors identified in the *Report on Road Safety Progress Since 2000*.

47. The first actions from 2010 should be those that have the largest impact on the road crash problem. That is the first action plan should address the five areas of high concern – increasing the safety of young drivers, reducing alcohol/drug impaired driving, safer speeds, safer roads and roadsides and increasing the safety of motorcycling.

Implementation

48. The intention is to release the *Safer Journeys* strategy in February 2010. The 10 year strategy will be implemented through three action plans. The action plans will provide greater detail on how the strategy will be implemented and who is accountable for actions with the first action plan released in the first quarter of 2010. The intention to provide the first package of legislative actions within the first action plan to Cabinet for approval in March 2010. When developing this first package detailed regulatory impact statements will be completed which will consider compliance costs, risks and enforcement. Enforcement

will be considered for each initiative and this will involve considering changes to the Road Policing Programme.

49. The below table provides information on the legislative vehicle and Ministry recommended timing for each of the probable first actions in the *Safer Journeys* strategy that require regulatory change.

Possible Action	Legislative Vehicle	Ministry Recommended Timing
Raise the minimum driving age to 16 and extend the length of the learner licence period from 6 to 12 months	Land Transport Amendment Bill and Driver Licensing Rule	First action plan - Amendment would ideally be secured in 2010 12 months required for IT changes after legislation is enacted
Make the restricted licence test more difficult to encourage 120 hours of supervised driving practice in the learner licence phase	Driver Licence Amendment Rule	First action plan - on the rules programme for 2010
Lower the youth blood alcohol limit (for drivers under 20 years) from 30 mg alcohol/100ml blood to zero	Land Transport Amendment Bill	First action plan - Amendment would ideally be secured in 2010
Lower the legal adult blood alcohol concentration limit for driving from 80mg alcohol/100ml blood, to 50mg alcohol/100ml blood	Land Transport Amendment Bill	First action plan - Amendment would ideally be secured in 2010
Address recidivism and high level offending through: • *compulsory alcohol interlocks* • *a zero drink drive limit for offenders*	Land Transport Amendment Bill	First action plan - Amendment would ideally be secured in 2010
Improved motorcycle rider training and licensing	Driver Licence Amendment Rule	First action plan - on the rules programme for 2010
Change the 250cc restriction for learner motorcycle riders to a combined power-to-	Driver Licence Amendment Rule	First action plan - on the rules programme for 2010

weight ratio of 150kw per tonne and 660cc restriction		
Change the give way rules for turning traffic	Road User Rule change	First action plan – Ideally completed November 2010 and in force April 2011

Monitoring, evaluation and review

50. Road safety has an excellent record of monitoring progress of outputs and outcomes. The *Safer Journeys* action plans will be monitored and reviewed to evaluate their effectiveness. This will require developing new measures to monitor the improvements in roads and vehicles. In addition to monitoring the results, the capacity and capability of the sector in delivering the strategy will be monitored. These functions will be carried out by the National Road Safety Committee.

51. At the end of each three year action plan's term a review will be completed to inform the development of the next action plan.

ANNEX A: *Source documents*

TOWARDS ZERO: AMBITIOUS ROAD SAFETY TARGETS AND THE SAFE SYSTEM APPROACH - ISBN 978-92-821-0195-7 c OECD/ITF, 2008

Report on Road Safety Progress Since 2000, Ministry of Transport, December 2009

Comparing Safer Journeys proposals with Australian road safety initiatives, Ministry of Transport, December 2009

Summary of submissions on the Safer Journeys discussion document, Ministry of Transport, November 2009

Youth version of Ministry of Transport Safer Journeys consultation report, Ministry of Youth Development, October 2009

Safer Journeys Discussion Document – ISBN 978-0-478-07243-3, Ministry of Transport, August 2009.

Road Safety Strategy to 2010 – ISBN 0-478-24142-9, October 2003