


22 April 2022



Tēnā koe 

I refer to your email to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), requesting the following under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act):

“...Details of an incident when an Air NZ DC8 on a twin locator approach to Wellington's runway 16 nearly hit houses in the suburb of Newlands, North of Wellington. Date was 21 September 1975 in the evening. Crew names were Capt. Don Nicol, F/O Lyndon Davidge and E/O Barrie Davis. Where had the aircraft come from, where was it going after WN, and what disciplinary action was taken at Wellington or Nandi after the incident? Also details of previous reports on the Newlands NDB's accuracy, and the effect of nearby high-tension cables interfering with the radiated signal.”

Your request was transferred by the CAA to the Ministry of Transport on 7 April 2022.

There are 10 documents which fall within the scope of your request and are enclosed. The documents are listed in the document schedule attached as Annex 1.

You have the right to seek an investigation and review of this response by the Ombudsman, in accordance with section 28(3) of the Act. The relevant details can be found on the Ombudsman's website www.ombudsman.parliament.nz

The Ministry publishes our Official Information Act responses and the information contained in our reply to you may be published on the Ministry website. Before publishing we will remove any personal or identifiable information.

Nāku noa, nā



Tom Forster
Manager Economic Regulation

Annex 1

Doc#	Date	Document	Decision on release
1	24 th September 1975	Internal memorandum	Released in full.
2	21 st September 1975	Tape transcript ZKNZE	Released in full.
3	21 st September 1975	Tape transcript A.T.C. Supervisor's console	Released in full.
4	undated	Landing reports ZK-NZE missed approach	Released in full.
5	22 nd September 1975	Weather conditions 1900-2030hrs	Released in full.
6	23 rd September 1975	Report by duty Approach Radar Controller	Released in full.
7	23 rd September 1975	Report by Twr Co-ord	Released in full.
8	23 rd September 1975	Observation of events	Released in full.
9	25 th September 1975	Report by supervisor on duty	Released in full.
10	21 st September 1975	Tape transcript ZK-NZE: Precision Radar approach	Released in full.



MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT

Our ref.: 78/6/3

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

Your ref.:

To: ADCA (GS) From: Aerodrome Superintendent,
Civil Aviation Division, WELLINGTON AIRPORT.
M.O.T. HEAD OFFICE.

Date: 24th Sept. 1975

Subject: APPROACH AND OVERTHOOT AIR NEW ZEALAND NZE: 21.9.75:

The attached reports relate to the above missed approach:

- 1. VHF radio communication transcripts.
- 2. Telephone transcripts Duty Supervisor ATC to NZE Captain.
- 3. Weather conditions 1900 to 2030 hours.
- 4. Landing Reports KILO and LIMA.
- 5. Statements from the Aerodrome Controller, Aerodrome Co-ordinator and Approach Director.

Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have been supplied to ADCA (FO).

C. W. Latham
C.W. LATHAM
AERODROME SUPERINTENDENT.

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FILE
30/10/75
Initials: ADCA(FO)

TIME	IDENT	MESSAGE
1943	NZZE WN AWY	NZZE CCS ON TRANSFER WN 54. NZZE ROGER. IDENTIFIED AT CCS. CLEARED TO WN VIA CG AND PU. DESCEND AT TOP OF DESCENT DESCEND ROUTE DME TO 7000FT.
	NZZE	CLEARED WN CC PU TOP OF DESCENT ROUTE DME TO 7000 ZE AND QNH AND WN WEATHER.
	WN AWY	AFFIRMATIVE WN WEATHER KILG 1013 AND THE INITIAL WIND AVERAGING 170M/18 SWINGING 150 TO 190M MAXIMUM 23 DEVIATION 10.
	NZZE	COPIED.
1946	WN AWY NZZE	NZZE CROSSING CG CONTACT WN APP 120.3 120.3 ZE
1947	NZZE WN AWY	OUT OF 250 FOR 7000 ON 1013. NZZE ROGER
1949	NZZE	WN ZE CC ON TRANSFER
1950	WN APP	NZZE WN ROGER IDENTIFIED AND YOU'RE CLEARED TO CONTINUE DESCENT TO 4000FT ON PU EXPECTING LLZ APPROACH OVER
	NZZE	NZZE TO 4000 ON PU NZZE
	WN APP	ZE WHAT'S YOUR PRESENT ALTITUDE
	NZZE	PASSING 170 NZZE
	WN APP	OUT OF 170 ROGER
	WN APP	NZZE I AM ADVISED THERE IS NO CHANGE IN YOUR INITIAL WIND
	NZZE	NZZE
1953	WN APP	NZZE WHAT'S YOUR PRESENT HEADING
	NZZE	NZZE 008
	WN APP	ROGER LEFT TURN NOW HEADING 35 (PAUSE) 5 355 YOUR NEW HEADING DIRECTION TO LLZ APPROACH.
	NZZE	355 NZZE
	WN APP	ZE COMING UP TO WEST OF FIELD FOR LLZ APPROACH
	WN TWR	OKAY
1956	NZZE	NZZE LEVEL AT 4000.
	WN APP	NZZE ROGER. LEFT TURN 10 DEGREES HEADING 345 AND CONTINUE DESCENT TO 3000FT.
	NZZE	345 TO 3000 NZZE
	WN APP	NZZE IS CROSSING THE COAST A MILE AND A HALF NORTH OF MAKARA. RIGHT TURN SHORTLY.
	NZZE	ZE

1957 WN APP ZE TURN RIGHT NOW HEADING 020.
 NZZE UNDERSTAND NZZE TO 020
 WN APP ZE AFFIRMATIVE
 WN APP (UNREADABLE) NZZE IS 15 MILES FOR LLZ.
 TWR O.K.
 WN APP ZE FURTHER RIGHT NOW TO HEADING 090 - 090. YOU ARE
 3 1/2 MILES WEST OF FINAL APPROACH AND ALMOST ABEAM PU.
 NZZE NZZE ROGER. WOULD YOU SAY AGAIN THE FIRST PART OF
 YOUR MESSAGE.
 1958 WN APP RIGHT TURN HEADING 090. YOU ARE 3 MILES WEST OF FINAL
 APPROACH ABEAM PU.
 NZZE 090 NZZE.
 1959 WN APP ZE. RIGHT TURN 40 DEGREES HEADING 130 - 130 YOUR
 HEADING.
 NZZE 130 NZZE.
 WN APP ZE. KEEP THAT RIGHT TURN GOING AND ADJUST AS NEC-
 ESSARY TO INTERCEPT THE LLZ. REPORT ESTABLISHED.
 NZZE NZZE
 NZZE NZZE IS ESTABLISHED.
 WN APP ZE ROGER 10 MILES TO TOUCHDOWN. CLEAR TO CONTINUE
 APPROACH. CONTACT POWER.
 NZZE NZZE
 2002 TWR 589. WHEN AIRBORNE CONTACT APPROACH CONTROL 120.3.
 CLEAR FOR TAKE OFF.
 589 589
 2003 TWR SORRY HOLD POSITION MEANTIME
 589 589 HOLDING
 TWR THE REASON IS THAT I HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR A
 SIGHTING OF A DC8 WHO SHOULD BE ON APPROACH. I HAVE
 SIGHTED HIM BUT IT APPEARS HE'S GOING ROUND.
 589 589
 WN APP HAS THE DC8 GONE ROUND
 TWR LOOKS LIKE IT.
 WN APP BETTER PUT HIM OVER TO ME.
 TWR I HAVEN'T GOT HIM. HE HAS NEVER SPOKEN TO ME FROM
 START TO FINISH.
 WN APP BLOODY HELL. HE WAS TOLD TO. RIGHTO.
 WN APP NZZE - WN
 WN APP NZZE - WN
 TWR HILLO
 WN APP YOU'D BETTER CALL HIM EH! HE'S NOT WITH ME.

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TWR ISN'T HE.
 WN APP GIVE HIM A SHOUT AND PUT HIM BACK TO ME.
 TWR O.K.
 2004 WN APP NZZE THIS IS WN APPROACH. DO YOU READ
 WN APP NZZE THIS IS WN APPROACH. DO YOU READ--
 NZZE - 120.3 NZZE READING YOU FIVE NOW. ESTABLISHED ON
 THE OVERSHOOT LEVEL AT 3000FT.
 WN APP NZZE - ROGER. I'LL GIVE YOU VECTORING NOW TO
 PRECISION APPROACH, RUNWAY 16, OR WOULD YOU PREFER
 LLE AGAIN. OVER.
 NZZE NZZE. WE'LL TAKE THE PRECISION COMBINED WITH THE LLE.
 THANK YOU.
 WN APP NZZE ROGER. RIGHT TURN NOW TO HEADING 320 - 320
 UNDER DIRECTION TO PRECISION/LLE APPROACH.
 NZZE NZZE
 2006 NZZE NZZE - WN. DID YOU HAVE A RADAR CHECK OF OUR APPROACH
 PATH ON THAT LAST INBOUND.
 WN APP ZE. NEGATIVE. WE HAD NO QUALIFIED MAN WATCHING THE
 PRECISION EQUIPMENT.
 NZZE NZZE
 2007 NZZE WN - NZZE COULD YOU CHECK ON THE CLOUD BASE PLEASE SIR.
 2008 WN APP ROGER STAND BY
 WN APP GIVE US A CLOUD BASE CHECK WILL YOU.
 TWR I'LL CALL YOU BACK
 WN APP GO AHEAD
 TWR HE IN FACT WAS BREAKING THROUGH WHEN HE OVERSHOT
 AND THAT WOULD PROBABLY BE ABOUT 2000FT - SAY 1800
 TO 2000 FEET TO THE NORTH.
 WN APP O.K. THANKS
 WN APP NZZE. RIGHT TURN NOW TO HEADING 355 - 355 YOUR HEADING
 AND TOWER ESTIMATE THE CLOUD BETWEEN 2 AND 2500 OVER
 NZZE NZZE
 WN APP IF MAY BE LOWER ON THE HILLS.
 2009 WN APP NZZE IS SIX MILES SOUTH WEST OF PU. RIGHT TURN IN
 FOUR MILES.
 NZZE NZZE
 2010 TWR QNH NOW 1014.
 WN APP ROGER THANKS
 WN APP NZZE CHANGE QNH NOW 1014 MRRG. TURN RIGHT HEADING
 030 - 030 OVER.
 NZZE RIGHT 030 NZZE

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2011 WN APP NZEE. YOU ARE ABOUT TO CROSS MANA ISLAND.
 NZEE
 WN APP NZEE. RIGHT TURN NOW HEADING 100 - 100.
 2012 NZEE RIGHT 100 NZEE
 WN APP ZE KEEP THAT RIGHT TURN GOING HEADING NOW 140 - 140
 CORRECTION MAKE THAT 150.
 NZEE 150 NZEE
 2013 WN APP NZEE. COMING UP TO 11 MILES FROM TOUCH DOWN. TURN
 RIGHT NOW 155 - 155 YOUR HEADING AND EXPECT PRECISION
 IN ONE MILE
 NZEE 155
 WN APP NZEE ON FINAL NOW AT 9 1/2 MILES CLEARED NOW TO 2100
 FEET OVER
 NZEE 2100 NZEE
 WN APP NZEE CONTINUE STEERING 155 AND CONTACT PRECISION ON
 124.5 ACKNOWLEDGE
 NZEE TO 124.5 NZEE
 (NOTE: THE PRECISION APPROACH, LANDING AND TAXI
 CLEARANCE WERE ALL ROUTINE AND CONTAIN NO REFERENCE
 TO PREVIOUS OVERTHOOT. FULL TRANSCRIPTS CAN BE MADE
 AVAILABLE IF REQUIRED).

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2042

SUPER- CONTROL CENTRE. GOOD EVENING.
VISOR

CAPT. YES GOOD EVENING, THIS IS DON NICHOL HERE, THE
NICHOL SKIPPER OF FIVE OH TWO.

SUP OH GOOD EVENING

CAPT. YES

SUP EH, YOU MANAGED TO GET IN AMONGST OUR PHONE CALLS
OBVIOUSLY.

CAPT. EH YES, ER YES, I BELIEVE WE'VE CAUSED A BIT OF
PROBLEMS.

SUP YES ER

CAPT YES, ER SORRY ABOUT THAT UM, LOOK, UM, A BIT CONCERNED
ABOUT THIS, ER, YOU KNOW FROM MY POINT OF VIEW AND
FROM YOURS AS WELL.

SUP MM

2043

CAPT UM, DO YOU KNOW WHETHER WHETHER UM, ER, PAR WAS
MONITORING OUR APPROACH AT ALL?

SUP NO THEY WERE NOT.

CAPT THEY WERE NOT.

SUP NO YOU WEREN'T ON A PAR MONITOR.

CAPT OH SHATTER ME. UM, NO INDICATION OF ANY BEACON
FAILURES.

SUP NOTHING THAT WE ARE AWARE OF.

CAPT UM, CAN THIS BE BACK CHECKED IN ANY WAY.

SUP. EH (PAUSE) YES, IT PROBABLY CAN, ALTHOUGH YOU KNOW
IT MAY BE DIFFICULT SOMETHING WHICH IN HIND SIGHT IS
ALWAYS HARD TO DO.

C

CAPT YEA, LOOK, I'D APPRECIATE IT IF IT COULD BE DONE AS
PAR AS THE NEWLANDS BEACON WAS CONCERNED. UM, I'LL
TELL YOU WHAT THE STORY WAS, WE UM WE WERE RADAR
MONITORED AND THE OTHER THING I'D LIKE TO KNOW FROM
RADAR WAS EXACTLY ER, WHEN THEY MONITORED US ON THAT
TURN, HOW FAR BETWEEN PORIRUA AND NEWLANDS WE WERE
ACTUALLY DOING THE INTERCEPT, OR WHETHER IT WAS OUT-
SIDE OF PORIRUA.

SUP YES, JUST A MINUTE, I'LL TELL YOU THAT (UNINTELLIGIBLE
TALK IN THE BACKGROUND).

2044

YEA, WELL DAVE RECKONS HE TURNED YOU ON INSIDE PORIRUA....

CAPT YEA

SUP ... AND THAT YOU ESTABLISHED, ABOUT, ER YOU KNOW,
BETWEEN NINE AND TEN MILES OUT.

CAPT

THAT'S EXACTLY WHERE WE MADE IT TOO. YEP, O.K. THAT'S ALL RIGHT, SO IT WAS NINE TO TEN MILES OUT, ER RIGHT, THATS O.K. NOW WHAT, WHAT APPARENTLY HAPPENED ON THIS ONE WAS THAT WE, WE ER, YOU KNOW, MAINTAINED OUR INBOUND TRACK LOCALISER WAS GOOD, NO PROBLEMS AT ALL. WE OVERHEADED, OR, ER APPARENTLY OVERHEADED NEWLANDS, UM COMMENCED OUR DESCENT FROM THERE, BROKE OUT OF CLOUD, AND ER, WE WERE EXTREMELY LOW ON, OR WE APPARENTLY WERE VERY LOW ON HOUSES AT THAT STAGE. NOW, ER, WHICH MEANS THAT IN FACT WE HAD NOT PRESUMABLY OVERHEADED NEWLANDS.

SUP

YOU THINK YOU HAD A FALSE OVERHEAD.

CAPT

YEAH, UM, AND ER, YOU KNOW, THIS IS THIS IS A THING THAT WE CAN'T REALLY KIND OF WORK OUT WHY, BECAUSE NOW EVERYONE ON THE FLIGHT DECK WAS MONITORING OUR APPROACH ON THIS ONE, ERM, AND THERE WAS NO APPARENT FAILURE ON ANY OF OUR STAFF AT ALL.

SUP

YEA, WELL WE DIDN'T MONITOR A FAILURE IN HERE AT ALL...

CAPT

NO, ER, YOU WOULD HAVE GOT ONE IF YOU HAD.

SUP

WE SHOULD HAVE GOT ONE.

CAPT

YEAH, SO THE THING WAS, WE JUST POURED ON POWER AND WENT AWAY, UMM

SUP

THAT'S WHAT WOKE EVERYBODY IN NEWLANDS UP.

CAPT

YES THAT'S RIGHT, WELL, YOU KNOW, HOW, HOW LOW IN FACT WE WERE, THE THE ENGINEER RECKONS WE WERE AT SIXTEEN HUNDRED FEET, UM, WHEN I COMMENCED THE OVERSHOOT, UM, AND UM FOR THE MOMENT OF THE THING IT SEEMED THOSE LIGHTS I HAD THAT HORRIBLE THOUGHT THAT WE WERE HEADING IN TOWARDS MOUNT VIC. AT THAT STAGE, SO WE DOUBLE CHECKED ON THIS AND AS FAR AS ALTITUDES WERE CONCERNED WE WERE ONLY AT ABOUT SIXTEEN HUNDRED FEET BUT THE NOISE WE MADE DEPARTING WOULD PROBABLY HAVE ERM, YOU KNOW, SCARED EVERYONE.

SUP

YOU CERTAINLY STARTED UP ALL THE TELEPHONE CALLS.

CAPT

YES.

SUP

EM

CAPT

WELL I I'M

SUP

WHEN YOU WERE MONITORING DID YOU ER GET THE OUTER MARKER.

2046

CAPT

ER (PAUSE) YES, NOW THE OUTER MARKER IS BASED EXACTLY WHERE?

SUP AT NEWLANDS

CAPT AT NEWLANDS, YEAH, WE HAD GOT THE OUTER MARKER (PAUSE) WE GOT THE OUTER MARKER ... NOT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THAT OVERHEAD EITHER.

SUP YES, WELL, YOU MIGHT HAVE GOT A FALSE OVERHEAD ON NEWLANDS.

CAPT I THINK WE MIGHT HAVE ON THAT YEAH, YEAH, THAT'S RIGHT, THAT'S RIGHT.

SUP DO YOU RECKON YOU GOT THE OUTER MARKER AFTER.

CAPT YEAH (PAUSE) YES THAT WOULD BE THAT WOULD BE RIGHT SO CHECKING ON THAT, THAT WOULD BE THAT WOULD BE DEAD RIGHT ACTUALLY AND IT WAS NOT LONG AFTER THAT, AFTER THE OUTER MARKER, BECAUSE I REMEMBER DOUBLE CHECKING AT THAT STAGE ER, WITH THE CO. AS FAR AS THE BEACONS WERE CONCERNED BECAUSE UM, ER, BECAUSE OF THE OUTER MARKER AND UM, IT MAY WELL BE THAT WE HAD GOT A FALSE OVERHEAD ON THAT THE OTHER, THE OTHER THOUGHT IS WE WERE PROBABLY NOT AS LOW AS APPARENTLY IT LOOKED YOU KNOW, WITH THE LIGHTS GLARING UP THROUGH THE CLOUDS THERE UM SO, ER WE'LL WRITE A NOTE ON IT ANYWAY BECAUSE WE'LL HAVE TO DO SO AS FAR AS THE

SUP WELL, I THINK, I THINK ER, THE MAIN REASON I'VE RUNG YOU, I'M GOING TO HAVE TO LOG THE FACT THAT THERE'S A HELL OF A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE GOT STIRRED UP.

CAPT YES

SUP ER, AND THERE WILL BE ALL SORTS OF BLOODY STORIES AS YOU CAN IMAGINE.

CAPT OH YEAH, YEAH

SUP ERM ER, SO YOU HAVE TO SAFEGUARD ... AGAIN (UNREADABLE) SO DO WE.

CAPT OH YEAH, YEAH, I'LL HAVE TO DO THAT.

SUP THERE'S NOTHING, I DON'T AT THIS STAGE, I SEE NO REASON FOR US TO MAKE ANY REPORT OF ANY FORM, BUT I'LL HAVE TO MAKE A LOG ENTRY ...

CAPT NO, NO WELL ITS JUST THE FACT AS I SAY THAT USING THE POWER THAT WE DID TO OVERSHOOT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE WOKEN THEM UP, ER, SO, ERM RIGHT OH WELL I'LL STOCK A NOTE IN - IT WON'T GET TO AIR NEW ZEALAND UNTIL TOMORROW NIGHT BECAUSE I'M, WE'RE HEADING OFF TO NABI.

SUP YEP YEP OH YOU'RE OUTBOUND AGAIN NOW ARE YOU.

2047

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CAPT YES, WE'RE OUTBOUND TO NADI.
SUP YES
CAPT SO UNLESS UM, UNLESS YOU WANT ANYTHING MORE ER URGENT THAN THAT, I MIGHT COMPOSE SOMETHING AND GET IT DOWN ON TELEX TOMORROW TO AUCKLAND.
SUP IN ACTUAL FACT, THE FIRST INDICATIONS YOU HAD WERE REALLY VISUAL WHEN YOU WERE BELOW CLOUD I SUPPOSE.
CAPT WELL, WELL IT WAS NOT SO MUCH VISUAL BELOW CLOUD AS WE WERE ABOUT TO BREAK BELOW CLOUD, WE WERE IN KIND OF ER, ER RAIN, RAINY SQUALL THERE. ER, AND IT WAS JUST MERELY THE SEEING OF WHAT WERE OBVIOUSLY HOUSE AND STREET LIGHTS ER AT VERY CLOSE QUARTERS.
SUP YEP, YEP
CAPT ER, ER, SO HAVE YOU HAD ANY CHECKS ON HOW WIDE THE INDICATION IS ON THE OUTER MARKER FOR THERE.
SUP ER, WELL, WE OBVIOUSLY KNOW, BUT I WOULDN'T KNOW OFF HAND.
CAPT NO
SUP THE CALIBRATION SYSTEM WOULD KNOW WHAT THE EXTENT OF ..
CAPT YEAH, I'M JUST WONDERING TO WHAT TO WHAT DEGREE THE OUTER MARKER COMES IN YOU KNOW, EITHER SIDE OF THE ACTUAL INDICATION OF OVERHEAD.
SUP THAT'S SOMETHING WE CAN, WE CAN GET FROM THE FLIGHT OPS SECTION.
CAPT YES
SUP ITS NOT SOMETHING WE CARRY AS STANDARD PRACTICE.
CAPT YES, YES.
SUP AS FAR AS WE'RE CONCERNED, THE GEAR IS EITHER SERVICEABLE OR IT'S NOT.
CAPT YES
SUP IF ITS SERVICEABLE IT HAS GOT TO BE WITHIN TOLERANCE. JUST WHAT THOSE TOLERANCES ARE I DON'T NECESSARILY KNOW OFF HAND.
CAPT NO. O.K. WELL I'LL CHECK AGAIN WITH THE CREW AND SEE EXACTLY WHAT THEIR IMPRESSIONS WERE OF IT AND ER -
SUP I'M AFRAID WE ARE GOING TO HEAR ABOUT IT.
CAPT YES I THINK WE POSSIBLY WILL. UNDOUBTEDLY I WILL TOO.
SUP O.K. THANKS VERY MUCH INDEED.
CAPT O.K. I CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING MORE AT THIS STAGE. IF YOU DO WANT ANY FURTHER INFO GIVE US A YELL ON THE AIRCRAFT. I CAN COME DOWN AND TALK TO YOU FURTHER IF

YOU WANT ANY FURTHER INFORMATION. BUT I'D LIKE -
I'D APPRECIATE IT IF RADAR HAVE GOT ANY INDICATION
OF ANY TRACKING ERRORS OR, AS YOU SAY THEY WEREN'T
MONITORING IT ON THE PAR WHICH WAS A PITY, BUT STILL -
I THINK I SHOULD HAVE CALLED FOR A PAR EARLIER ON -
I THINK ER,

SUP YES, IT WAS AVAILABLE BUT WITH 16 IN USE THERE IS
NO REQUIREMENT TO MONITOR.

CAPT NO THIS IS RIGHT.

SUP O.K.

CAPT O.K. THANKS GOODBYE.

.....

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IDENTIFIER	KILO	LIMA
RWY	16	16
SURFACE WIND	180/20	150/20
VISIBILITY	20KM	20KM decreasing 10KM lgt Rain
CLOUD	2/1200	2/1200
	5/2500	5/2500
TEMPERATURE	+11	+11
QNH	1013	1014
TYPE OF APPROACH	2 NDB or LLZ	2 NDB or LLZ
2000FT WIND	170/14	160/22

TRANSMITTED UP
TO 2010

TRANSMISSION COMMENCED 2011

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NEW ZEALAND METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT



P.O. BOX 722 WELLINGTON
 TELEPHONE: ~~40-801~~ 888-310
 TELEGRAMS: METEO

Wellington Airport,
 22nd September 1975

The Aerodrome Superintendent,
 Wellington Airport.

WEATHER CONDITIONS 1900-2030HRS 21/9/75

The weather conditions on the evening of 21/9/75 from 1900HRS to 2030HRS are tabulated below in plain language form.

1900HRS WIND 200T/15kts VIS 8KM PAST SHOWERS 3/8 ST 1000 6/8 CU 1600
 TEMP 11 DEG QNH 1013.1 MBS KAU KAU WIND 010/07kts REMARKS:
 SOUTHERLY COMMENCED 1830HRS

1930HRS WIND 190T/18kts 20KM PAST SHOWERS 2ST 1200 5/8 CU 2500 TEMP 11
 QNH 1013.8 KAU KAU WIND 190/14kts REMARKS: AIRCRAFT AT 1900
 REPORTED MAIN BASE AT 2500

2000HRS WIND 190/18kts 15KM PAST SHOWERS 3/8 ST 1100 6/8 CU 2500 TEMP 11
 QNH 1014.1 MBS KAU KAU WIND 180/22kts

2030HRS WIND 190/18kts 15KM PAST SHOWERS 1/8 ST 800 4/8 ST 1500 6/8 CU
 2500 TEMP 11 QNH 1014.1 MBS KAU KAU WIND 180/21KTS

T.H. Smith

Officer in Charge.

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Aerodrome Superintendent
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

D.R. Ward
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

23 September 1975

MISSED APPROACH ZK-NZE: 21.9.75:

I was Duty Approach Radar Controller on the evening of 21.9.75 during which an Air N.Z. DC8, ZK-NZE, overshot prior to completion of a LLZ approach.

I am at a loss to explain why this aircraft may have flown below the normal glide path during his LLZ approach as has been alleged by some members of the public. Until the overshoot the flight appeared to be a routine exercise in every way.

I became aware of the overshoot during a casual glance at the PAR when an aircraft was observed to be climbing in the vicinity of the Newlands Beacon. (Note: I am neither trained nor qualified in the duties of a Final Radar Controller).

I assumed this to be NZE and called TWR by phone for confirmation and to request that the aircraft be re-established on APP Frequency for further direction.

Due to the low traffic state, I had overheard the AWY Controller pass the current weather and QNH to NZE and as the QNH required no adjustment to altimeters from the standard setting used above transition level, I saw no reason to reiterate this information.

I am convinced that the danger of inadvertent undershoot could be substantially reduced if all approaches under instrument conditions were monitored by PAR as a standard procedure. Had this approach been so monitored, it is unlikely that I should now be writing this report.

D.R. WARD



Aerodrome Superintendent
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

B.P. James
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

23 September 1975

MISSED APPROACH ZK-NZE: 21.9.75:


I was Twr Co-ord when DC8 NZZE was making a LLZ approach which was not continued beyond approximately NL NDB.

No turbulence had been reported prior to the missed approach nor after.

There was no evidence or report of electrical disturbance.

My estimate of cloud conditions in the approach sector at the time is:- Broken with some cloud at 1200' some at 1600-2000' a ceiling at 2500'.

I saw the DC8 lights from an estimated range of five miles until it made a right turn overhead the airfield.


B.P. JAMES

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Aerodrome Superintendent
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

H. Anderson
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

23 September 1975

MISSED APPROACH EK-NZE: 21.9.75:

Observation of Events:

As the tower controller ANZ NZEE was transferred to me via the
tower co-ordinator for a LLZ approach RWY 16.

No call was received from the aircraft although a target
believed to be NZEE was observed on the D.F.T.

The aircraft came into sight at about 4 miles, the landing
lights became perfectly clear (estimated height 1400-1500') and
then immediately began to merge with cloud again as if there
were lower patches of cloud ahead, but it immediately became
obvious the aircraft was climbing on a missed approach. NAT 569,
a B737 was held on the runway meantime awaiting takeoff.

The DCB was observed through the breaks in the cloud as it
approached the airfield (est. alt. 3000') and was then contin-
uously visible overhead and during its right turn, until it was
overhead Haskins Hill northbound.

I called NZEE on 118.7 mains and H.R. transmitters after it
commenced the missed approach procedure but no contact was made.

Selections from the tower were as follows: LLZ - RWY 16
RRILS, T2Z - 30%, ASP, RWY lights - 10% and T VASIS - 3%.

Weather:

No C.B.'s were observed and no evidence of C.B. activity or
electrical disturbances was seen during the period. There had
been no reports of significant turbulence in the W area.

Immediately prior to the approach of NZEE I went out onto the
landing to observe the conditions. There was no clear layer
indicating from the cloud searchlight and general observation
was that the visibility was generally 20km and had reduced pre-
viously to 10km with the passage of a light shower although the
least visibility at this time was approx. 15km. Observed cloud
was approx. 2/8 s.c. at 1200' along the Western hills from H.R.
to the City and on the Eastern side of the harbour. Conditions
over the field were clearer - bkn CU/SC approx. 2500'.

...../2

PAGE TWO:

Reports appeared to indicate approach area base to fluctuate between 1500-2500' and observations confirmed this as aircraft had previously been breaking clear at about 3½-4 miles (DFTI) at what I would consider to be about 1500'.

From 2000M to 2030M conditions altered at the field with an increase in cloud at 1500'.



H.S. ANDERSON

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Aerodrome Superintendent
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

C.T. Henderson
WELLINGTON AIRPORT

25 September 1975

MISSED APPROACH ZK-NZE: 21.9.75:

I was Supervisor on duty at the Wellington Air Traffic Control Centre on Sunday evening of 21 September 1975.

ANZ DC8 ZK-NZE carried out a missed approach from a localiser approach from the vicinity of Newlands NDB.

Any other considerations aside, I anticipated some phone calls from Newlands to complain about noise. Numerous calls were received complaining of noise and a low flying aircraft.

Captain Nichol was asked to contact Wellington Centre. This conversation is recorded on tape.



C.T. HENDERSON

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2014 NZZE

WN Precision NZZE 124.5

FAR

NZZE, TURN RIGHT 10 DEGREES HEADING 165, YOU ARE ON FINAL APPROACH TRACK, YOU HAVE ONE AND A HALF MILES TO RUN TO INTERCEPT THE GLIDE PATH FROM BELOW. HOW DO YOU READ ME?

NZZE

STRENGTH FIVE NZZE

PAR

FIVE ALSO. DO NOT REPLY TO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. YOUR HEADING IS 165, CHECK THAT YOUR WHEELS ARE DOWN AND LOCKED. TURN RIGHT A FURTHER 5 DEGREES HEADING 170. YOU HAVE GONE THROUGH FINAL APPROACH TRACK TO BE SLIGHTLY LEFT. 170 THE NEW HEADING. 7½ MILES TO GO, SHORTLY INTERCEPTING GLIDE PATH FROM BELOW. STAND BY TO LOSE ALTITUDE. HEADING 170. CONTINUE YOUR DESCENT NOW TO MINIMUM ALTITUDE 7 MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN. THE HEADING IS GOOD, CLOSING GENTLY WITH TRACK FROM A SHADE LEFT. CLEARED TO LAND (NOT TRANSMITTED)

TWR

PAR

AND NZZE YOU ARE CLEARED TO LAND - CLEARED TO LAND. ON GLIDE PATH NOW DESCENDING: CHECK YOUR MINIMUM ALTITUDE FOR THIS APPROACH. TURN RIGHT A FURTHER 3 DEGREES HEADING 173 - 173 6 ½ MILES TO GO, GOING JUST A SHADE BELOW GLIDE PATH AT 6 MILES AS YOU CROSS THE NEWLANDS RIDGE. 173 - COMING ONTO TRACK FROM VERY SLIGHTLY LEFT HOLDING VERY SLIGHTLY BELOW GLIDE PATH. HEADING IS GOOD, HOLDING SLIGHTLY BELOW GLIDE PATH, FIVE MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN. TURN LEFT 3 DEGREES HEADING 170 - 170 HOLDING SLIGHTLY BELOW GLIDE PATH, 4½ MILES TO GO AND CLEAR OF THE NEWLANDS RIDGE. TURN LEFT A FURTHER 2 DEGREES HEADING 168 - 168, RETURNING SLOWLY TO GLIDE PATH FROM SLIGHTLY BELOW, JUST A SHADE TO THE RIGHT OF TRACK - 168 - NOW ON GLIDE PATH. 4 MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN ON TRACK AND ON GLIDE PATH: RIGHT 2 DEGREES HEADING 170, ON TRACK, ON GLIDE PATH. 3½ MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN. YOU ARE CLEARED TO LAND: HEADING IS GOOD ON GLIDE PATH RATE OF DESCENT IS GOOD. 3 MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN NOW. LEFT 2 DEGREES HEADING 168 ONCE AGAIN, DRIFTING JUST A SHADE TO THE RIGHT OF TRACK, 168 - ON GLIDE PATH, 2½ MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN. LEFT A FURTHER 2 DEGREES, HEADING 166, GOOD RATE OF DESCENT, 2¼ MILES TO GO. 166 THE HEADING ON GLIDE PATH JUST A SHADE TO THE RIGHT OF TRACK, TWO MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN. GOOD RATE OF DESCENT, HOLDING

PAGE TWO:

TO THE RIGHT OF TRACK AND I SEE YOU MOVING FURTHER TO THE
RIGHT OF TRACK TO INTERCEPT FINAL APPROACH, NZZE CONFIRM
THAT YOU ARE CONTINUING VISUALLY, ACKNOWLEDGE.

2018 TWR I'VE GOT HIM IN SIGHT.
PAR IS HE TALKING TO YOU.
TWR NO
PAR HE'S NOT TALKING TO ME.
TWR AH WELL: HE'S GOING TO LAND FROM THE LOOK OF IT.
PAR O.K.

2019 NZZE (124.5) NZZE THANK YOU SIR TO TOWER
NZZE (118.7) NZZE
TWR NZZE, CLEAR TO TARMAC
NZZE NZZE

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